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a b s t r a c t
In the last decade, the EU has driven forward the development and connection of renewable power
sources across Europe. This has changed the way in which distribution networks operate, moving from a
passive system, to a more active system where generation and demand are located closer together with
system states being more complex and variable. Increased penetration of renewable generation into
distribution networks is presenting a number of challenges to Distribution Network Operators (DNOs)
including the provision of network access in capacity constrained networks. The introduction of Active
Network Management (ANM) is enabling an increase in renewable generation connections through
enhanced network access in otherwise ‘full’ networks.
This paper presents a way in which DNOs might move towards Business as Usual (BAU) arrange-
ments for ANM schemes. It is necessary to determine the curtailment arrangements, or Principles of
Access (PoA), and from this estimate generation access under ANM and the ﬂow of services and money
for different scenarios. In this paper, a comprehensive literature review, detailed case study evaluation
on early ANM schemes, quantitative curtailment assessment for different PoA and a qualitative analysis
of business models for different ANM PoA is presented in turn with conclusions drawn from these three
approaches.
& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
1. Introduction
The European Union (EU) is currently in the process of moving
towards ‘greener’ technologies with a drive to encourage the
adoption of renewable energy technologies. The threat of climate
change is a global concern and the EU governs a signiﬁcant degree
of energy policy in the United Kingdom through directives which
are applicable to all EU member states.
EU Directive 2009/28/EC (The European Parliament and the
Council of the European Parliament, 2009) sets renewable energy
targets for all member states to achieve by 2020 in overall energy
production and transport. The targets state that 20% of energy
generated in the EU and 10% of energy used in transport should be
from renewable means. The directive requires member states to
set their own personal targets; these must however be consistent
with 2009/28/EC.
UK Government targets outlined in the UK Government Low
Carbon Transition Plan (HM Government, 2009) state that around
30% of electricity will be generated from renewable energy sources
by 2020. The Scottish Government has also set its own ambitious
targets, aiming for 100% of electrical demand to be met from
renewable energy by 2020 (Scottish Government, 2011).
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To encourage the connection of renewables, a number of
incentives were introduced by the UK Government including the
Feed-in Tariffs (FITs) (Ofgem, 2013b) and Renewable Obligation
(RO) (Ofgem, 2013c).
The RO is the most signiﬁcant incentive for renewable genera-
tion development in the UK, where generators are rewarded
Renewable Obligation Certiﬁcates (ROCs) for each MWh of energy
produced by renewable energy sources.
The value of ROC has an important impact on the price paid to
the renewable generator for electricity produced. The ROC price
is set at a ﬁxed rate for each year, while the market price of
electricity ﬂuctuates, and the long term value of the PPA is
typically lower than the average market rate (Cornwall and
Littlechild, 2008)
The number of ROCs awarded varies depending on the tech-
nology, namely to encourage investment in less developed tech-
nologies (Department of Energy and Climate Change and Ofgem,
2013). The value of ROCs is set by Ofgem each year and will change
over the years in line with the Retail Price Index (RPI). An example
of ROC prices can be found online at the e-ROC website (e-ROC,
2013). The current Electricity Market Reform (EMR) (Department
of Energy and Climate Change, 2011) will introduce Contracts for
Difference (CfDs) and these will replace ROCs by 2017. The aim of
CfDs is to remove the long term exposure of low carbon technol-
ogies to volatile electricity prices. CfDs ensure that generators
receive payments for energy produced at a ﬁxed price, known as
the ‘strike price’. If the electricity price is lower than the strike
price, low carbon generators will receive a top-up payment to
make up the difference from suppliers. However, if the electricity
price is higher than the strike price, then low carbon generators
must pay back the difference.
Feed in Tariffs (FITs) apply to any generators smaller than 5 MW
and the rates vary depending on the size of installation and the
technology used. FIT prices are set by Ofgem each year. Prices for
the 2013/2014 period are available on the Ofgem website (Ofgem,
2013d).
At transmission level, Connect and Manage was introduced by
National Grid (2009) with the aim of facilitating the connection of
new renewable generation to the transmission system. Connect
and Manage allows all new generators, regardless of size or type,
to connect to the network by simply carrying out the required
local upgrades (around the point of connection) without waiting
for any wider transmission network upgrades that might be
required. Connect and Manage also applies to large embedded
generation (greater than 50 MW) on the distribution network.
Through the introduction of Connect and Manage, applications
from renewable generators for connection to transmission and
distribution networks have increased (National Grid, 2011).
At distribution level, the increase in Distributed Generation (DG)
connecting led to a change in the behaviour of the distribution
network (CIGRE Working Group C6.09, 2011). Traditionally, distribu-
tion networks were designed to transport electricity from transmis-
sion grid connection point down through to lower voltages and
eventually to demand customers. However, with the connection of
DG the location of generation is now closer to demand, and in some
cases the direction of power ﬂow may be reversed i.e. more
electricity is generated in the distribution network than is required
by demand and will therefore ﬂow up to transmission level.
Legislation at EU and UK levels has provided the stimulus and
incentive to develop renewables, but there are three sets of issues
which can sometimes restrict the connection of renewable gen-
eration to the power system. These include:
1. Network issues which focus on local issues such as lack of
capacity on the network to enable new connections, and also
control of voltage and reactive power levels on the network.
2. System issues which can include security of supply, back up
reserve and system balancing. Systems which are overloaded
with new generation may have difﬁculty in balancing genera-
tion and demand.
3. Market issues such as the subsidies, compensation for curtail-
ment, use of system charging, and electricity pricing.
Currently, solutions are being developed to these three issues,
and ANM is emerging as a serious contender for solutions to the
ﬁrst of these problems i.e. better control of network and enabling
additional generation to connect.
A number of deﬁnitions for ANM were deﬁned by a CIGRE
working group report (CIGRE Working Group C6.11, 2011). The
authors deﬁne ANM as the control of power, voltage and frequency
within a network through the use of remote control and commu-
nication technologies.
ANM schemes allow the increased connection of renewable
generation (Currie et al., 2007) to the distribution network. In
order to do so, there may be some curtailment of renewable
generators required. For the purpose of this paper, curtailment can
be deﬁned as the reduction of output of wind generation to an
output level lower than current availability of the generators.
While this suggests curtailment has a negative effect on wind,
it is in fact a positive result for wind farms connecting to
constrained networks. Without ANM and the curtailment of wind
generation during certain time periods, the generators would not
have been able to connect to the network without costly and time
consuming upgrades. (Currie et al., 2010)
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, examples of
curtailment practices are presented and Principles of Access (PoA)
which have been collected as part of a literature review and are
assessed against a list of criteria, and the advantages and dis-
advantages discussed. Section 2.2 presents case studies of ANM
schemes which have applied PoA and the cost of the ANM scheme
is compared with traditional reinforcement costs. In Section 3,
a quantitative analysis of different PoA is carried out using
constraint management techniques. Section 4 goes on to discuss
the ‘Business as Usual’ (BAU) case for ANM schemes and demon-
strates how a DNO might recover the costs associated with the
ANM installation when they are no longer funded through
innovation funds such as the Low Carbon Network Fund. Finally,
Section 5 contains concluding remarks on how DNOs might move
towards BAU with ANM schemes that apply PoA to curtail
generation.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Principles of Access
PoA for wind generators in ANM systems is a relatively new
ﬁeld of research. In order to gain an understanding of PoA, it is
appropriate to look to transmission systems to build on previous
learning. At transmission level, short-term access trading (Shaaban
and Bell, 2009) is a method identiﬁed as a possible short-term
solution to the problem of transmission access rights to integrate
renewable generation. The principle works by trading generation
capacity between renewable generation and conventional genera-
tion in particular transmission network zones to make efﬁcient use
of renewable generation whenever possible. For example, when
wind conditions are good then access rights can be traded from a
conventional generator who has ﬁrm access rights to the wind
generator with non-ﬁrm rights. Trading could also take place
during planned outages of the conventional generator or during
periods when wind conditions are poor. DC power ﬂow analysis is
used to determine which generators can trade access rights
L. Kane, G. Ault / Energy Policy 72 (2014) 67–7768
between each other. Difﬁculties in trading agreements may arise
because of generator size. Wind farms may need to buy more
access rights than they require because it may not be possible for
the generator which the wind farm is trading with to reduce
output by the required amount. The scale of this issue depends on
trading partner size and technical speciﬁcation of the generation.
A study by Rogers et al. (2010) and Fink et al. (2009) has
identiﬁed methods of curtailment on international transmission
systems. Xcel Energy in the United States provides transmission
services for eight Western and Midwestern states. There are two
regulatory bodies which take care of the curtailment procedures
for this group of states. Firstly, Northern States Power and South-
western Public Service curtail wind turbine generators on a
rotational basis when required. Public Service of Colorado (PSCO)
has made contracts with certain generation plants to curtail a set
amount per year on an as-needed basis. If additional curtailment is
required then curtailment operates on a rota basis. With regards to
compensation, Northern States Power pays a price per kWh for
both ﬁxed and variable costs of generators. PSCO will pay the price
per kWh for energy and production tax (the US version of ROCs)
on any additional curtailment outside of the contracted amount.
In Spain, there are two methods of curtailment. Firstly, there is
programmed curtailment where decisions are made before the
day-ahead market is closed. Secondly, there is a real time market.
Curtailment instructions are sent out from the system operator to
the wind generators via the Control Centre for Renewable Energies
and the Generation Control Centres (GCC). All wind power greater
than 10 MW must be connected to the GCC. Analytical models are
used to determine the need for curtailment. All real-time curtail-
ment receives compensation of 15% of the wholesale price for each
hour which is multiplied by the theoretical production based on
the wind forecasts.
The above international examples demonstrate effective meth-
ods of wind curtailment; however in order to implement the
above in distribution networks, some changes may be required
due to generator size and differences in roles of distribution and
transmission system operators. There are several examples of
curtailment management strategies at distribution level and these
are discussed below.
In several of the existing, early deployed ANM schemes, the
current method of curtailment is ‘Last In First Off’ (LIFO). This
means that the ﬁrst non-ﬁrm generator unit (NFG) to sign a
contract is always the last NFG to be curtailed. While this is an
easy method to administer it does not provide the optimal use of
resources and in some cases can lead to generators being need-
lessly curtailed depending on speciﬁc network conditions. LIFO is
the approach used in the Orkney ANM scheme (Currie et al., 2010),
and the one which will be applied in the Northern Isles New
Energy Solutions (NINES) scheme on the Shetland islands (Gill
et al., 2013).
A study by Currie et al. (2011) has identiﬁed a number of
possible contractual arrangements which could be applied to
curtailment schemes. Based on an initial assessment of the PoA
options against set criteria which considered the technical, com-
mercial and regulatory strengths of each approach (EIRGRID,
2011), LIFO and Market Based approaches are noted as the most
feasible PoA.
Recent work carried out by UK Power Networks has discussed
potential PoA for their ‘Flexible Plug and Play’ network develop-
ment (Baringa Partners and UK Power Networks, 2012). A litera-
ture review of national and international case studies was carried
out (Anaya and Pollitt, 2012)and a number of options for managing
NFG including LIFO, market based and a pro rata approach was
considered.
The report assessed a number of PoA options based on ﬁve
assessment criteria. These include network efﬁciency, certainty,
simplicity, fairness, and learning. The PoA considered for the FPP
project involved a number of variations on LIFO and Pro-rata
curtailment. The restrictions upon the selection included timing,
and having to work within the current regulatory framework. The
ﬁnal choice for PoA was a Pro-Rata PoA with a cap on the volume
of capacity able to connect (Laguna Estopier et al., 2013). The
generation capacity cap was determined by calculating the point at
which the total generation curtailment cost over the lifetime of the
generator was equal to the cost of required network reinforce-
ments. Beyond this cap, generators would be curtailed based on a
LIFO PoA. All existing connections will not be affected by new
PoA rules.
A combination of PoA such as pro rata and market-based
could provide a practical solution for many curtailment strategy
approaches in ANM schemes however more research is required
into the impact and behaviour of potential market arrangements
for distribution networks.
The PoA studied in this paper have been identiﬁed in the
literature review presented above and is not an exhaustive list of
possible arrangements. In this paper, PoA are grouped into non-
market and market arrangements to highlight the level of control
which the system operator and NFG have over curtailment levels.
In order to critically assess PoA, a number of assessment criteria
are developed from existing criteria found in the literature (Currie
et al., 2011; EIRGRID, 2011; Bell et al., 2011). These criteria will be
used to assess the PoA discussed in the following sections. It is
suggested by the authors that a suitable PoA should:
1. Support safe, secure and reliable power system operation.
2. Encourage efﬁcient investment and operating decisions by the
distribution companies, generators and consumers such that
the overall cost of electricity is minimised.
3. Not present undue barriers to the utilisation of low carbon
electricity.
4. Be fair, equitable and transparent.
5. Be robust against future generation, demand and network
changes.
6. Be practicable.
7. Be as simple as possible to achieve the objectives, and no
simpler.
8. Not have an unduly negative impact on existing connection
agreements.
9. Gain sufﬁcient support of stakeholders to allow implementation.
10. Allow investors to be able to estimate, with sufﬁcient con-
ﬁdence, future income and expenditures in order to secure
investment from ﬁnancial backers.
11. Comply with all Generator technical standards and network
design standards.
2.1.1. Non-market arrangements
Non-market arrangements use predetermined rules to curtail
NFG. These rules are decided by the DNO and NFG must adhere to
these rules in order to connect to the network. Non-market
arrangements are simple for the DNO to implement as no changes
to current rules and regulations are required.
2.1.1.1. Last n First Out (LIFO). Under this method, the ﬁrst NFG to
be curtailed under a constraint event is the chronologically last
NFG to connect to the network or added to an ANM scheme.
Adding a new NFG connection to the LIFO priority list (in the
position of least priority) does not alter the priority position of
existing NFG. This approach is consistent, transparent and easy to
implement within the current UK regulations. However, this
method would not necessarily be the best way of fully utilising
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the available network capacity or the available renewable
generation. For example, the lowest priority generator may be
located furthest from the constraint which would result in a
higher volume of curtailment required when compared with a
generator located closer to the point of congestion. As the number
of NFG increases, the Capacity Factor (CF) for those at the bottom
of the priority list may begin to approach unacceptable levels, and
discourage any new NFG connections.
2.1.1.2. Pro Rata. The pro rata method divides the required
curtailment equally between all NFG contributing to a network
constraint. The total amount of curtailment would be shared by each
of the NFG based on the ratio of rated or actual NFG output to total
required curtailment. Implementing this method would grant
equitable access for multiple NFG. However, it is difﬁcult for the
DNO to calculate the long term volumes of curtailment of this method
since, as more NFG is connected, the level of curtailment of each NFG,
including those already connected with NFG contracts, will increase.
To some extent, this can be solved by setting a cap on the level of
generation which can be connected to a particular network location
without the network being reinforced. This then gives a minimum CF
which allows generators to calculate return on investment.
2.1.1.3. Shedding rota. This method curtails NFG based on the order
speciﬁed in a predetermined rota. This rota could be changed on a
daily, weekly or monthly basis using the network operator's
discretion. As the level of generation connected under a rota
arrangement increases, the level of curtailment may increase
however the length of time spent at the bottom of the priority
stack would decrease. This uncertainty could be eased if the DNO
were to set a cap on the amount of generation that can connect to
the network, thus calculating a minimum CF that each NFG might
experience.
2.1.1.4. Technical best. This PoA curtails the NFG in order of size of
contribution to the prevailing constraint or based on which
generators are most effective (in power systems terms) in
relieving the constraint. In general, this would vary for different
types of constraints and network conﬁgurations. This approach
would ensure a minimisation of the volume of energy curtailed
and the most efﬁcient operation of the network. This approach
may discriminate against certain NFG based on their location and
capacity; however it could also encourage the DNO to upgrade the
network at an earlier date.
2.1.1.5. Greatest carbon beneﬁt. This method aims to minimise the
carbon emissions associated with actively managed networks by
curtailing NFG which will result in the greatest reduction in CO2
emissions. Based on a carbon metric such as CO2/MWh per
generating unit the network operator could prioritise NFG in the
curtailment scheme. Generators could be grouped into a number
of different ranges of CO2 emissions, similar to ROC banding. If the
group of NFG all has similar CO2 emissions then this method could
be combined with a second POA e.g., pro rata or LIFO to apply
curtailment. There may be difﬁculties in the calculation of true
carbon emissions of each generation in a clear, open and fair
manner.
2.1.1.6. Most convenient. This method allows the system operator
to curtail the generator they know to be the most convenient i.e.
easiest to implement and most effective for relieving network
constraints. There may be unfair discrimination against certain
types of generators based on location, control room preference
and size of generator. The assessment may also be inﬂuenced by
system operator preference which raises issues regarding fairness
and transparency.
2.1.1.7. Generator size. This method curtails the largest generator
that is contributing to a constraint ﬁrst, where size refers to output
at time of constraint. This method has the advantage of easing
network congestion quickly by regulating or removing the largest
NFG ﬁrst. This PoA could be deemed unfair, and may discourage
efﬁcient investments from developers e.g., reluctance to install
larger generating units.
2.1.2. Market arrangements
Market Arrangement type PoA use some form of constraint
market with a bidding system to determine the curtailment order
of NFG.
Market PoA do not impact on existing connections (assuming
they have a ﬁrm connection and their rights are ‘grandfathered’)
and, in principle, is sustainable for future network developments.
In addition, there is potential to extend the market to existing ﬁrm
connected generators should they choose to participate.
These approaches will require the largest change from existing
practice in distribution networks, and require the development of
market rules and structure under which the generators could
operate. This will require a large input from all bodies involved –
generators, system operators, regulators, etc. and a potentially
complex set of market procedures.
2.1.2.1. Curtailment market. A curtailment market might take the
form of generators submitting bids on an annual, quarterly,
monthly or daily basis in which they indicate their willingness to
curtail. In a perfect market, this bid would be equal to the price the
NFG would have received had they been allowed to generate
during the constraint period. The system operator will always aim
to clear the constraint with minimum cost to the system i.e. the
lowest bids will be curtailed ﬁrst. Compensation might be paid-as-
bid, reﬂect the curtailment market clearing price, or be a ﬁxed
price e.g., a percentage of the price of wholesale electricity during
that particular period. This option gives control to generators to
submit bids which reﬂect their desire to remain connected and
could encourage participation from existing ﬁrmly connected
generation. However a new market system would need to be
established and it may require large changes to the distribution
and grid codes.
This section has provided an extensive literature review of the
area of curtailment management strategies and PoA in ANM
schemes. By looking at examples at both transmission and
distribution level it is possible to develop a list of potential PoA
arrangements for consideration in ANM schemes for the future.
The next section will look at projects which have applied PoA to
their own ANM schemes and discuss the cost of the projects when
compared with conventional network reinforcement solutions.
2.2. Principles of access case studies
The following case studies have applied PoA to NFG connecting
to a distribution network within an ANM scheme. The case studies
highlight the beneﬁts and problems faced with the different PoA
and also how these arrangements are implemented in terms of
contractual arrangements and the costs of the project compared to
traditional network reinforcements. The UK is currently at the
forefront of trials of ANM, so only one example from outside the
UK, is included in the review below. More examples of curtailment
strategies exist at transmission level as discussed in Section 2.1,
and many of these are documented in (Rogers et al., 2010).
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2.2.1. Orkney ANM scheme
The ANM scheme on the Orkney Islands is the ﬁrst of its kind in
the UK. A number of papers (Currie et al., 2004, 2006, 2007, 2010;
MacDonald et al., 2008) have detailed the research and develop-
ment of the Orkney ANM scheme.
A LIFO arrangement is currently being used on the Orkney ANM
scheme. When curtailment is required, the ANM controllers will
send trim/trip signals to generators behind the constraint in the
order determined by the LIFO priority stack (Currie et al., 2007).
Generators at the bottom of the stack will be ﬁrst to curtail. The
network is divided into ‘constraint zones’ with each zonal bound-
ary being a constraint point, as shown in Fig. 1.
The system is managed in real-time via the use of a Programmable
Logic Controller, which receives measurements of power and current,
and uses private or public radio links to communicate commands to
generators. In addition to ANM solutions, several reactive compensa-
tion devices and shunt reactors have been installed to resolve local
voltage rise problems at speciﬁc locations on the Orkney network.
A report produced by KEMA (2012) on the Orkney ANM scheme
highlights the project successes and problems encountered during the
creation of the ANM scheme. The total cost of the ANM scheme to date
has been approximately d500,000. Generation developers remained
interested in connecting to ANM scheme regardless of projected
curtailment ﬁgures, most likely due to high CFs when compared with
mainland GB.
The Orkney ANM project was implemented as an alternative
solution to network reinforcements. These reinforcements would
have been in the form of a new 33 kV subsea cable linking Orkney
to mainland GB grid, which would have cost an estimated d30 m.
Regardless of the construction of the subsea cable, there would
still be local constraints on the network which would require some
form of constraint management of exporting generation. From
inception as a research project, the Orkney ANM scheme took
6 years to reach operational stage (2003–2009). This lengthy
period was the result of advanced modelling required for gen-
erators, extensive testing, and external factors such as planning
consent and construction work for the ﬁrst generators.
The Orkney ANM scheme is based on a locally centralised
architecture with network and generation output measurements
communicated back to a central processing unit sited at the
operational hub for the Orkney power network. Control instruc-
tions are calculated there and communicated out to controlled
generating units. The necessary SCADA and Distribution Manage-
ment System interfaces, communications links with watchdogs
and local fail-safes are integral to this architecture.
One of the key early lessons learned from the Orkney ANM
Scheme was the importance of communication systems. The
communications for each curtailable site was the responsibility
of the generator. There were problems with NFG who used
existing lower frequency radio links or leased copper wire links.
When the communication links between generators and network
are down the generators are automatically issued a zero set-point
to prevent any network problems. As a result of initial unreliability
of some of the communication links, there were higher levels of
curtailment for some generators.
Another key lesson learned involved the inclusion of micro-
scale wind generation in the Orkney ANM scheme. Initially, only
wind generation greater than 50 kW capacity was installed with
monitoring and communication equipment required for curtail-
ment instructions from the ANM scheme. While this was justiﬁed
from a ﬁnancial viewpoint (i.e. the smaller generators had less
funds available to pay the cost of installing monitoring and
communications equipment) it has resulted in a large volume of
micro-generation ‘eating’ into the capacity of larger generators in
the LIFO stack which has led to higher levels of curtailment for
those larger generators. The impact of individually curtailing a
single sub-50 kW machine will have little impact on network
constraints, therefore in order to prevent further increase to
curtailment of existing NFG as the level of new sub-50 kW
generation increases, the second generation ANM system for
Orkney will include control of micro-generation clusters. On/off
controls will be issued to control group clusters to manage
network constraints. These simpliﬁed controls will reduce the
cost of the controller required for ANM participation and existing
communication will be utilised to keep the costs of ANM scheme
low for small sub-50 kW generators (Foote et al., 2013).
2.2.2. Shetland ANM integration
The electricity network in the Shetland Isles is composed of
three main 33 kV circuits connecting three large scale generating
sites and outward to primary substations supplying demand at
11 kV and low voltages level. The Shetland network is not connec-
ted to the mainland GB grid. A number of network issues have
thus far prevented more than 3.6 MW of wind connecting to the
network (Gill et al., 2013).
Funded by the Low Carbon Network Funds (LCNF), Scottish and
Southern Energy (SSE) and Strathclyde University, the NINES
project is researching ways to increase and optimise the amount
of renewable energy ﬂowing on the island network (Scottish and
Southern Energy Power Distribution, 2012). Better management of
the Shetland network, through demand side management and
ANM systems will allow an increase in the level of renewable
energy able to connect and decrease the volume of fuel burned by
conventional generation on the island.
The NINES scheme will operate a LIFO PoA for the curtailment
of all NFG connecting to the system. Micro-generation will be
included in the ANM scheme, therefore avoiding issues experi-
enced by the Orkney ANM scheme, discussed in Section 2.2.1.
The cost of the NINES scheme is estimated to be around
d33.54 m (Ofgem, 2013a) and this includes the ANM scheme,
domestic demand side management, a district heating system
and a 6 MWh battery. Network reinforcement solutions which
Fig. 1. Orkney distribution network with zone boundaries (Scottish and Southern
Energy Power Distribution, 2013).
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would require the construction of a subsea cable to connect to the
mainland GB network would cost in the region of d300 m (TNEI
Services Limited, 2007).
2.2.3. Flexible Plug and Play ANM implementation
The Flexible Plug and Play (FPP) project is one of the Tier Two
LCNF projects awarded funding in 2012 (Central Networks, 2005),
and is trialling new commercial solutions for connection of
renewable generators. Through the introduction of ANM technol-
ogies and PoA, UK Power Networks hope to fast-track the
connection of renewable generation and reduce the cost of
connections. The alternative is a lengthy delay while network
reinforcements are carried out or a high connection cost to
generators in order to connect at a neighbouring grid connection
point or at a higher voltage level.
A comparison of connection costs is shown in Table 1. Sig-
niﬁcant savings are shown for generators wishing to connect to
the network by introducing the non-ﬁrm connection option under
the FPP connection scheme.
A Pro-Rata PoA is applied to the FPP project, as it was shown to
provide higher long term CFs for NFG when compared with LIFO,
as long as a cap was set on the maximum level of NFG which could
connect to the network. Once this cap is reached, LIFO will be
applied to subsequently connecting NFG.
The cost of the FPP ANM scheme is approx. d6.7 m (total
funding awarded by Ofgem) which compares to reinforcement
costs i.e. upgrading the transformer, of d15.3 m (UK Power
Networks, 2012) One consideration for the future of the network
is that as the level of connected NFG increase, thermal constraints
could be created in some areas of the network. In this case, new
curtailment zones are created. At the present time, curtailment is
based around a constraint at the grid connection point and
connection agreements with generators will have this constraint
written in to the contract. With new constraint locations, the
question arises as to how curtailment might be allocated and if CFs
might be reduced to a value lower than previously guaranteed by
the DNO. This refers to issues regarding the level, to which DNO
must guarantee certain CFs in ANM schemes, and should a level be
exceeded then what level of compensation should be provided.
2.2.4. Belgian east loop ANM programme
The Belgian transmission and distribution operators, Elia and
ORES, are experiencing increasing network constraint on genera-
tion connection and operation in the south east region of Belgium.
The transmission systemwas initially designed to meet lower rural
demand, but with increased connection of wind and other DG in
the region, the 70 kV transmission lines are now at their thermal
limits due to reverse power ﬂows.
In order to allow the connection of further renewable genera-
tion in the region, Dynamic Line Rating and non-ﬁrm connection
agreements will be used. The scheme will apply a pro rata
approach to curtailment, where curtailment is proportional to
the output at the time of the constraint. (Durieux et al., 2011).
The Dynamic Line Rating scheme was installed and trialled by
Ampacimon (Schell et al., 2012) and provides additional headroom
for new non-ﬁrm connections on the network. The introduction of
these ANM strategies will allow prompt connection of renewables
in the area, however a full scale trial has still to take place and cost
of the ANM project are not currently available in the literature.
This section has provided a review of four ANM schemes which
are implementing PoA.
The following section gives results from a numerical analysis of
different PoA methods.
3. Results
3.1. Analysis of Principles of Access
In order to compare the impact of different PoA, a quantitative
analysis was carried out using a power ﬂow constraint ANM
technique. This example applies the PoA within the constraint
analysis to compare the impact of LIFO, pro rata and rota arrange-
ments on NFG CFs. Relevant demand and generation data for the
case study network is used to identify periods of constraints, and
then apply PoA to the 11 NFG connected to the network. The PoA
are applied using the cost functions in the OPF model i.e. the
generator with lowest priority will be assigned the highest OPF
costs in order to ensure it is curtailed ﬁrst. This is similar to the
method proposed by Dolan et al. (2012). The Constraint Analysis
Process is shown in Fig. 2.
The results shown in Fig. 3 demonstrate the change in CF for 11
NFG behind a single constraint in a real example network.
Generator A is top of the priority list i.e. last to curtail under LIFO.
Under a rota arrangement, the priority order is changed every
24 h. Under a pro rata arrangement, the curtailment is shared
between all non-ﬁrm generators depending on output at the time
of curtailment. The CFs have been calculated for a typical full year
of half hour trading periods.
The results demonstrate that while LIFO allows NFG at the top
of the priority list to only experience a small change in CF, the rota
and pro rata arrangements result in more of a levelised CF across
all NFG generators. This highlights the important issues of fairness
and legacy rights.
The quantitative analysis provides a comparison for different
PoA in ANM schemes. Depending on the location and type of
constraint, different PoA may be suited to different network
topologies and conﬁgurations however the overlying conclusions
from this analysis suggest that while LIFO may be the most
straight forward PoA to implement, it does not result in the best
CF for the majority of NFG connected to the network.
In the next section we will carry out a qualitative analysis on
the way in which DNOs can recover the costs of ANM schemes
when compared with the methods used to recover the costs of
traditional reinforcements.
Table 1
Table of FPP connection costs vs. typical connection costs (UK Power Networks, 2012).
Project Capacity (MW) Typical connection offer (m) FPP budget estimate (k) Savings (%) Status
Gen A 5 d1.2 d570 53 Accepted FPP Opt in offer
Gen B 0.5 d1.9 d400 79 Accepted FPP Opt in offer
Gen C 10 d4.8 d500 90 Accepted FPP Opt in offer
Gen D 7.2 d3.5 d700 80 Accepted FPP Opt in offer
Gen E 2.5 d1.9 d170 91 Accepted FPP Opt in offer
Gen F 1 d2 d300 85 Pending
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4. Discussion
4.1. Business models for ‘Business as usual’ deployment of ANM
As discussed in Section 3 the costs of ANM schemes have been
shown to be lower than traditional network reinforcements.
However the mechanism by which costs are recovered and
allocated to stakeholders by network operators is yet to be
deﬁned. This section provides a qualitative analysis of the costs
and payment mechanisms and will outline two potential business
models for ‘Business as Usual’ deployment of ANM schemes.
Currently, the costs of network reinforcements are recovered
through a combination of connection and use of system charging
depending on the voltage level of the connection (National Grid,
2012b). To date, the cost of ANM schemes have received funding
through network research and development funds, and schemes
such as Registered Power Zone (RPZ) (Ofgem, 2012a) and LCNF
(Ofgem, 2012b). As ANM schemes become a ‘business as usual’
(BAU) option, a mechanism by which the network can recover the
costs of installing, operating and maintaining an ANM system
must be established.
One way of demonstrating a complex business model is
through the use of a visual aid. Business models developed by
Environmental Change Institute at University of Oxford (2011)
have been used as the format for the diagrams in Figs. 5 and 6. The
models help to demonstrate the ﬂow of money and services
between actors in the business model, as well as highlight
complexities and critical relationships. These models suggest one
method of recovering the costs of an ANM scheme; however, there
are many variations which could be determined as best practice
for different DNO and ANM schemes.
The legend for the business models in Figs. 5 and 6 is shown
below in Fig. 4. The list of actors is not exhaustive, and additional
actors may include aggregators, regulators and contractors (for
installation of equipment).
Currently, the ANM Operator is an actor who provides ANM
equipment, installs and maintains ANM equipment and manages
Fig. 2. Constraint analysis modelling process.
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Fig. 4. Legend for business models in Figs. 5 and 6.
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the ANM scheme. There is potential for each of these roles to be
carried out by different contractors in the future, or for the DNO to
take upon the role of ANM operator.
The base case against which all ﬂows are compared is a
standard network conﬁguration, without the inclusion of any
network management or incentives to encourage renewable
energy. Most domestic electricity users source power from verti-
cally integrated suppliers and large centralised generators. The
base case network is currently at full capacity and the DNO would
like to allow renewable generation to connect as soon as possible.
The standard way of doing this, would be to pay for network
upgrades i.e. upgrading transformers, overhead lines, etc.
4.2. Non-market ANM scheme
The model shown in Fig. 5 demonstrates the ﬂow of money and
services between key stakeholders in an ANM scheme applying a
non-market PoA such as LIFO. It proposes that the cost of ANM
management and installation of shared network equipment be
recovered through Distribution Network Use of System (DNUoS)
charges, similar to the way in which network reinforcements are
recovered. A more detailed description of Fig. 5 is given below.
In strand one of the Fig. 5 the ANM equipment is provided and
installed by the ANM actor. They also manage the network and
provide operation and maintenance (O&M). In strand two, the cost
Fig. 5. Business model of ANM scheme operating non-market PoA based on models developed by SuperGen HiDEF distributed energy modelling project (Environmental
Change Institute at University of Oxford, 2011).
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of ANM equipment is paid for by the NFG owner and the DNO. The
NFG owner costs for connection charge and ANM equipment is
lower than the connection charge under a traditional arrange-
ment, which would include both shallow and a proportion of deep
connection upgrade work.
Strand three highlights the changes in types of generators used
and how this is passed on to customers through DNUoS charging.
The installation of an ANM scheme on the network allows more
generation to connect to the network under a non-ﬁrm connec-
tion. The increase in renewable generation reduces the volume of
electricity provided by conventional generating methods. There
will be a portion of the DNUoS charge for the NFG which will
account for central ANM equipment and management; this how-
ever, is lower than costs which would be attributed to the
generator if deep network reinforcements were carried out.
Finally, strand four deals with the curtailment of NFG. This is
managed by the ANM operator. As a result of curtailment, there is
a reduction in export of renewable energy, and therefore a
reduction in revenue and proﬁt made by generators from ROCs
or FITs when compared with ﬁrm connected generation. The
Fig. 6. Business model of ANM scheme operating a market PoA based on models developed by ECI (Environmental Change Institute at University of Oxford, 2011).
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curtailment of wind power will be a result of one, or possibly more
of the reasons listed in Section 1 (e.g., frequency or voltage limits,
network stability or thermal constraints).
In addition to the basic recovery of costs for the construction,
operation and maintenance of the ANM scheme, there is the
option to create ancillary services by incentivising domestic
Demand Side Management (DDSM). The installation of storage
devices in the homes of domestic customers is being trialled by
SSE for the NINES project (Scottish and Southern Energy Power
Distribution, 2012). As part of this project, SSE are also required to
develop a sustainable business model to incentivise the uptake of
storage devices in the homes of domestic customers and a
mechanism through which to distribute the incentive.
4.3. Market ANM scheme
Similar to Fig. 5, the business model proposed in Fig. 6
demonstrates the ﬂow of money and services between stake-
holders in an ANM scheme applying a Market PoA e.g., where
generators submit bids and are curtailed based on the value of the
submitted bid. The ﬁrst three strands of Fig. 6 match those of Fig. 5
therefore the same logic and processes apply.
In strand four of Fig. 6, the diagram proposes a method of
recovering the cost of running a curtailment market. The non-ﬁrm
generators submit curtailment bids via an aggregator on a regular
basis, which could be hourly, daily, weekly, monthly, etc. –
depending on system operator preference. This value (d/MWh)
gives an indication of the desire to be curtailed. This value is likely
to reﬂect the value of lost ROCs or FITS and possibly additional
running costs such as O&M and repayment interest.
Use of system charging can still be used to cover the cost of
ANM installations; however any compensation to be paid to
generators for reducing output will come from the curtailment
market fund. This will be funded by charging a market participa-
tion fee. The market participation fee may take a form similar to
Balancing Services Use of System (BSUoS) charges applied at to
participants in the wholesale market at transmission level in GB
(National Grid, 2012a).
It is unknown if the level of compensation received by the wind
farms will be more, less or equal to that previously received
through incentive schemes such as ROCS and FITs. This will
depend on market competition, choice of compensation payment
and will change over time.
This model assumes that the ANM operator deals with indivi-
dual NFG directly however, it is possible that an Aggregator may
act as a ‘middle man’ between ANM Operator and NFG. This would
allow small wind farms who are perhaps not experienced enough,
or capable of dealing directly with a market system to beneﬁt from
the market ANM scheme.
5. Conclusions and policy implications
This paper has outlined a number of Principles of Access for the
curtailment of non-ﬁrm generation in Active Network Manage-
ment schemes and how the costs of Active Network Management
might be recovered as ‘business as usual’ by power network
operators.
Firstly an extensive literature review has allowed the reader to
understand the current issues faced by renewable generation
wishing to connect to power systems. The drive in the last decade
as a result of EU Carbon targets and UK Government incentives has
resulted in an increase in the volume of wind generators wishing
to connect to both transmission and distribution networks. This
increase in connection applications has not always been met by
increased investment in deeper network reinforcement and
therefore network operators have been forced to consider alter-
native connection approaches in order to allow renewable
generation connection. One method of doing so is installing an
ANM scheme which can manage power ﬂows on the network by
curtailing wind generation at times where there are constraints
e.g., voltage limits or thermal line limits.
The literature review then goes on to discuss the small number
of ANM trials at distribution level and examples of curtailment
from transmission level in the UK and worldwide are used to
develop a number of PoA at distribution level. These include LIFO,
a PoA which has successfully been implemented in the Orkney
ANM scheme, and Pro-Rata which was selected by UK Power
Networks for use in their FPP project in Cambridgeshire.
The case studies presented in Section 2.2 give an overview of
ANM schemes operating in the UK, and one proposed in Belgium.
Lessons learned from the Orkney ANM scheme are being applied
to the NINES ANM scheme in Shetland. The cost of all UK ANM
schemes discussed in the paper is signiﬁcantly lower than the
traditional network reinforcements as demonstrated in Table 2.
In Section 3, a quantitative analysis of different PoA arrange-
ments is presented. This allows comparison between three non-
market PoA and the impact they each have on NFG connected to
an example network. Constraint analysis techniques are used, and
the CFs compared in order to highlight the impact PoA can have on
the revenue of NFG.
As Ofgem encourages DNOs to move towards BAU for ANM
schemes, there is a need to determine how network owners and
operators will recover costs associated with ANM schemes. There
are a number of different ways in which network operators could
recover costs and a qualitative analysis of the options led to the
development of the business models presented in Figs. 5 and 6.
The development of new BAU cases will depend on a number of
factors, including regulation changes, distribution code changes,
market conﬁgurations, etc. The more changes required by any
proposed business model, then the more difﬁcult it may be to
implement these within a reasonable time frame.
In the long run, markets can result in the best scenario for all
parties however there are still a large number of issues to consider
with regards to curtailment markets and wider ANM roll out. The
inclusion of such technical difﬁculties, mean that the initial
beneﬁts of market PoA are not always apparent.
For centralised ANM equipment i.e. the central controller, there
are uncertainties as to how the cost of such large, shared equip-
ment will be recovered. One option is to charge the initial group of
NFG connecting to the scheme; however this could discourage
small developers from connecting. A second option, and the one
which is proposed in Figs. 5 and 6, is to recover the cost of shared
ANM equipment through DNUoS charging. This would result in
some of the cost being passed on to demand customers and the
DNO would have to justify this additional cost to the regulator.
Curtailment of wind generation will result in a reduced proﬁt
for the wind farm owners from ROCs or FITs – however this could
be compensated through use of a Market curtailment scheme.
Depending on the size of market participants, and number of
Table 2
Summary of ANM vs. reinforcement costs.
Additional
wind (MW)
ANM cost Traditional reinforcement
costs
Orkney 25 d500 k d30 million
Shetland NINES 10–15a d33.54 million d300 million
FPP 24.2 d6.7 million d15.3 million
a The NINES scheme also includes a 6 MWh battery, a district heating system
and domestic demand side management scheme.
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competitors, the level of compensation will vary. It is unknown if
this will be higher or lower than ROC/FIT levels. Future work by
the author is to explore market behaviour of wind generators in
curtailment schemes in order to determine likely outcomes from a
Curtailment Market.
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